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ABSTRACT
Whilst the Lega Nord has traditionally been defined as a regionalist populist
party, since Matteo Salvini became its leader in 2013 it has undergone a
process of profound ideological transformation. This article assesses this
momentous change and the impact it could have on the future of the Lega,
drawing on a content analysis of Salvini’s and the party’s Facebook posts, as
well as interviews with regional leaders. It argues that, under Salvini’s personal
style of leadership: (a) regionalism has been replaced by an empty form of
nativist nationalism, which fails to address socio-economic issues related to
the North–South divide; (b) populism remains central to the party’s strategic
communication, but the EU has taken Rome’s place as the people’s ‘enemy’;
(c) this ideological shift has paid-off at the 2018 general election, but is
underpinned by latent fractures between the leader and regional
representatives which could have profound implications in the future.
KEYWORDS Regionalism; nationalism; Lega Nord; populism; personalization
Introduction
Many parties have come and gone in Italy since the collapse of the so-called
‘First Republic’ at the beginning of the 1990s. Not so the Lega Nord (LN –
Northern League). Founded by Umberto Bossi in 1991, by 2008 it had
become the oldest party group in the Italian parliament. At the general elec-
tions held in March 2018, the LN gained over 17 per cent of the national vote –
i.e. 7 per cent more than its previous best result in a general election back in
1996 (10.1 per cent). Importantly, under Salvini the party performs strongly in
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the central regions of Italy that had once been dominated by the left and has
also managed to establish a presence in the South – a ‘no-go area’ for the Lega
under Bossi. In addition, the LN has already accumulated considerable experi-
ence of government participation. Over time, it gained the governorship of
some of the wealthiest regions in the country: Lombardy, Piedmont and
Veneto. It also served in national governments and, after a long gestation,
as of May 2018 it is back in power for the fifth time, now in a coalition govern-
ment with the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S – Five Star Movement).
The ‘Bossi era’ came to an abrupt end in April 2012, as a damaging fraud
scandal led to Bossi’s (basically forced) resignation as party leader (La Repub-
blica 2012, 2017). Following a brief interim period, in December 2013 Matteo
Salvini was elected leader by party members with 80 per cent of the vote
(against Bossi, who was attempting to stage a ‘come back’), and was
confirmed for a second term in May 2017 (with 82.7 per cent).
If the distinctiveness of Bossi’s LN resided in its ideology, which was best
defined as ‘regionalist populist’ (McDonnell 2006), as well as its unwavering
reliance on the ‘mass party’ organizational model (Albertazzi 2016), both
party ideology and organization appear now to be in flux under the new
leader. Indeed, the main finding of this article is that the LN now stands out
as the only Western ‘regionalist’ party to have turned to nationalism – a
unique case on which, to date, very little is known. Our aim here is to discuss
the party’s development, by assessing the changes that have affected it, with
a specific focus on ideology and the way the party communicates, while
leaving the discussion of party organization to a subsequent article.
The article will be organized as follows. The first section places the LNwithin
the academic literature on ‘regionalist’ and ‘populist’ parties, offers an overview
of the relevant debates on definitions and theoretical issues, and, in light of
such discussion, assesses its key features under its founder, and, until 2012,
only leader: Umberto Bossi. This allows us to clarify what we are comparing Sal-
vini’s LN with. In the second section, we summarize Salvini’s strategy since he
became leader. The third section introduces our methodology, whilst the fol-
lowing ones analyse Salvini’s (as well as the LN’s) discourse on social media
through a content analysis of Facebook, and draw suggestions from elite inter-
views with the leaders of some of the party’s regional branches. We show that
the request for greater northern autonomy (which once was the key issue
defining the LN’s agenda) has vanished from Salvini’s communication. Lastly,
we assess the implications of such developments for the LN, and argue that:
(a) the party has now dismissed the regionalist element of its ideology, embra-
cing what we define as ‘empty nationalism’, which lacks substance and fails to
address social and economic issues related to the North–South divide; (b)
populism remains central to the party’s strategic communication and values,
however there has been a substantial shift in the cleavage that underpins
the Lega’s message, as the EU has taken Rome’s place as the people’s
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‘enemy’; (c) this ideological shift has paid off at the 2018 general election, but is
underpinned by latent fractures between the leader and regional representa-
tives which could have profound implications in the long term. Throughout
the article, we argue that this radical shift has been made possible by Salvini’s
‘personalisation’ (Musella 2015) of his party – somethingwhich, so far, has given
him considerable room for manoeuvre.
The Lega Nord under Umberto Bossi: a regionalist populist
party.
The Lega Nord was born in 1991 by bringing together under the leadership of
Bossi’s Lega Lombarda (Lombard League) a wide range of autonomist move-
ments and ‘leagues’ that had established a presence across northern Italy
since the 1970s (Cedroni 2007). After its foundation, the party was very suc-
cessful in forcing two issues to the top of the national political agenda
(Bulli and Tronconi 2011): what would be known as the ‘northern question’
(Diamanti 1996), that is the growing economic and social gap between a
wealthy North and a much less developed South of Italy; and the rapidly
growing sense of discontent, and even hostility, towards the political elites
and institutions that had lingered on for a long time in public opinion, only
to reach a peak at the end of the 1980s (Bulli and Tronconi 2011, 51). Such
‘resentment’ towards the traditional political class soon translated into
support for new parties, such as the LN, and was instrumental in bringing
down the so-called ‘First Republic’ (Ginsborg 1990).
The intrinsically regionalist character of the LN can be assessed by making
reference to the relevant literature. Following the definition offered by Mazzo-
leni and Mueller (2017, 5–6), in essence,
regionalist parties are political parties that (a) demand more regional power who
[sic] are neither (b) organised on a nation-wide scale nor do they (c) possess the
ambition to represent the interests and people over, of and in the whole territory
of a country. Instead, regionalist parties are organised exclusively on a regional
basis and aim to cater for a regional electorate only. (…) [They also] have fully
subscribed to the territorial ideology of regionalism: they aspire to government
of, by and for the region.
The objective of governing on behalf of a region is usually pursued through
claims for regional autonomy and authority (in the form of shared- or self-rule)
to be gained by a regional community, via the creation of institutions able to
reflect and cater for specific regional needs (Mazzoleni and Mueller 2017, 6;
Keating 2013). Calls for autonomy are typically based on the assertion that
a region enjoys a distinctive sense of collective identity, grounded in some
combination of ethnic, linguistic, economic, geographic, religious and historic
traits, with some of these (say, a distinctive language) being activated in one
context, but being irrelevant in another.
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Based on this framework, Bossi’s LN satisfied all the criteria of a regionalist
party. It advocated a territorial cause, stood to defend and promote what it
saw as ‘its’ regions (broadly defined as ‘the North’ and/or ‘Padania’), consist-
ently presented them as ontologically different and distinctive from the rest
of the country (Keating 2009, viii; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005) and
argued that the centralization of political authority and economic resources
had damaged ‘northern regional interests and identity’ (Spektorowski 2003,
61–2).
Indeed, the LN elaborated its key themes by territorializing policy-making
(Hepburn 2010), and did so with reference to the territorial context of north-
ern Italy. Like other regionalist parties, under Bossi the LN also aimed at alter-
ing the vertical allocation of power between the centre and the periphery, by
seeking some form of autonomy for the North (whether by advocating feder-
alism, devolution, or even independence, depending on changing circum-
stances and political opportunities) (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015, 42–4).
Crucially, the LN has also long been characterized by regional exclusivity in
organizational terms (De Winter 1998, 211), by filing candidates only in north-
ern regions – a couple of unsuccessful and short-lived attempts at creating
‘sister league movements’ in the South during the 1990s notwithstanding.
Regionalist parties often present themselves as ‘anti-system’ (Hepburn
2009), and the LN under Bossi was, again, no exception. This links to the
second defining characteristic of the party, which is populism. In classic popu-
list fashion (Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000), the LN has always justified its juxta-
position of northern Italians with ‘Rome’ by positing the former as a
homogenous, hard-working community of people attached to their distinc-
tive traditions, and the latter as the place where the political and cultural
elites running the country (to the benefit of the South) could be found (Spek-
torowski 2003, 62–3). Despite the ‘elites’ having stolen much of the people’s
material wealth and even self-respect (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015, 42–
4), northern Italians could still save themselves, it was argued, by ‘regaining
control’ from the centre. Therefore, we subscribe to the view that ‘Bossi’s
Lega’ should be best understood as a regionalist populist party, above and
beyond any other label (McDonnell 2006), as its regionalist and populist
claims were profoundly intertwined, fed on each other and could hardly be
dissociated.
The LN’s ideology started to shift during the last years of Bossi’s leadership,
in ways that prepared the terrain for its further radicalization under Salvini.
Arguably, 9/11 was a godsend for the Lega, as it helped justify radicalizing
the party’s position from being critical of how immigration had been
managed by successive governments, to framing it as an existential threat
to the very survival of the identities and cultures of northern Italians, thus
tapping into the increasing fear and resentment of the local population
towards foreigners. As for the party’s leadership, after Bossi was forced to
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resign, the Lombard faction of the LN remained in charge. Following an
interim period in which the party was steered by the former Minister
Roberto Maroni, Matteo Salvini won a closed primary election and became
leader at the end of 2013, thus heralding a substantial generational
renewal. Salvini combined a long experience in the City Council of Milan
with roles at national and European levels. This allowed him to promote a
new focus on the national level, as we will see, while maintaining – at least
at the beginning – strong ties with the local dimension of the LN and its
powerbase of Lombardy.
‘North first no more’? Salvini’s (re)definition of the Lega Nord.
Salvini’s victory in December 2013 can be read as the natural result of a
process of party renovation, both in generational and ideological terms,
which was perhaps inevitable in order to turn the page and relegate scandals
to the past (Vercesi 2015).
Despite delivering his maiden speech as leader at the LN Conference of
December 2013 under a banner that read ‘The future is independence’
(Lega Nord 2013), only a few days later Salvini went on to apologize for the
insults he had directed at southerners throughout his political career and
claimed to have become persuaded that, either Italy saved itself as a
nation, or else all of its regions, without exception, would face ruin (Il Sole
24 Ore 2014). The main argument here was that, even if it could go it
alone, the North would still be the victim of regulations imposed by a ‘totali-
tarian’ EU (Salvini 2016, 138), and would also have to use a currency allegedly
set up to advantage the German economy: the Euro. In this way, the EU (rather
than ‘Rome’) came to be portrayed as the locus of real power. Speaking at the
LN Conference in July 2014, Salvini clarified the strategic implications of this
change of direction, by hailing the forthcoming creation of ‘one or more
movements’ across the whole of Italy which would ally themselves with the
Lega in the fight against the then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (seen as
being ‘pro-EU’). Shortly afterwards, ‘Noi con Salvini’ (NcS – Us with Salvini),
was set up. Since then, NcS has fought some subnational elections in
central and southern Italy, where the LN did not normally compete,
however its performance has been less than impressive (Biorcio 2017; Tron-
coni 2015). As the 2018 general elections approached, NcS suddenly disap-
peared, by merging with Salvini’s ‘new’ League.
The debate around the 2018 general election accelerated the pace of a
change that was already affecting the LN’s ideology and, again, Salvini
played a leading role in this process. Hence the increased focus on immigra-
tion, identity issues and law and order, perfectly consistent with the changes
that had already been noted during the last years of the ‘Bossi era’, was
accompanied by a development which radically contradicted the party’s
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raison d’être under Bossi: the shelving of calls for regional autonomy/reform
for northern Italy, and a distinct focus on the national dimension. As a
result, the LN filed candidates for the 2018 general election not just in the
North, but across Italy. This process culminated just before the election with
Salvini’s decision to drop the term ‘North’ altogether from the electoral
symbol of the party (Il Giornale 2017) – allowing him to strengthen the perso-
nalization process by adding his name on the logo of the party as its candidate
for the premiership (i.e. ‘Lega Salvini Premier’)1. As such, the Lega has come to
epitomize the rather unique case of a regionalist party that is ‘going national’
(although through an uneven and complex path), leaving its original claims
for northern regional autonomy, and the cleavages underpinning these,
behind. Bossi’s claim that ‘if Salvini brings the party to the South the Lega is
over’ (Ansa 2017) further reinforces the idea that this is a tectonic shift in
the party’s history (see also Diamanti 2017; Vampa 2017). And yet, in 2018
the LN put in its best electoral performance ever (Table 1), vindicating Salvini’s
decisions. The Lega overtook its long-standing coalition partner Forza Italia for
the first time since the 1990s, hence becoming the main party on the right. In
addition, as Table 2 illustrates, the LN has achieved this result by increasing its
support across the whole country (to varying degrees, but without exception).
The party performed extremely well in the North (e.g. in its traditional strong-
holds of Lombardy and Veneto), it grew in traditionally ‘red’ regions (e.g.
Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche), and it also established a pres-
ence in the South and the islands.
Therefore, since the election of Salvini as the new leader, the LN appears to
have developed a Janus-faced character. It maintains its traditional structure
as a party rooted in the North, however this is now mirrored by a much
lighter organization, which fields candidates across Italy, including the
South. Here, a weaker (or even non-existent) territorial presence has so far
been offset by heavy reliance on the leader’s ability to communicate, includ-
ing via social media, with a view that his popularity would (as it did in 2018)
Table 1. LN’s electoral performance in
General elections (1992–2018).
Year %
1992 8.7
1994 8.4
1996 10.1
2001 3.9
2006 4.6
2008 8.3
2013 4.1
2018 17.4
Source: Italian Interior Ministry.
Note: General election results refer to the Chamber of
Deputies. In 1994, 1996 and 2001, results refer to
the proportional share of the vote only
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deliver some degree of electoral success (see Vercesi 2015). The trait d’union
between the LN’s arguably irreconcilable ‘souls’, is, therefore, Matteo Salvini
himself. Thus, personalization serves to sustain and enliven mobilization (Kar-
vonen 2010) within the LN, and to widen its geographical spectrum. Bringing
his message (and persona) to the South allowed Salvini to paint on a blank
canvass, and gave him the opportunity to define the identity, values and
agenda of a ‘reinvented’ national Lega as he saw fit. However, this, in turn,
impacted on Salvini ‘the leghista leader’ (i.e. the leader of a party still rooted
in the North), as the latter could only act in ways that did not end up weak-
ening the credibility of the former.
Another development brought about by Salvini, which is crucial to our
argument, concerns the party’s communication. This now relies to a great
extent on the opportunities for permanent campaigning provided by social
media (SM), thus allowing Salvini to completely dominate the LN’s communi-
cation with help from a professional team of SM specialists. With 2.6 million
likes on Facebook and almost 800 000 followers on Twitter (as of June
2018), Salvini’s personal accounts can withstand comparison with those of
the major political leaders in the country.2 This helps him shape (and,
indeed, dominate) national debates on issues concerning identity, immigra-
tion, and law and order, as the controversial remarks made via his SM
accounts are immediately picked up by the press and television news.
Online activity does help party leaders to increase their approval and
involve new supporters (Kruikemeier et al. 2013). In particular, SM facilitate
Table 2. LN’s electoral performance in the General elections
2013 and 2018, by region (Chamber of Deputies) – %.
Region 2013 2018
Aosta Valley 3.29 17.5
Piedmont 4.8 22.6
Lombardy 12.9 28
Liguria 2.3 19.9
Veneto 10.5 32.2
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 6.7 25.8
Trentino-Alto Adige 4.2 19.2
Emilia-Romagna 2.6 19.2
Tuscany 0.7 17.4
Umbria 0.6 20.2
Marche 0.7 17.3
Lazio 0.2 13.4
Abruzzo 0.2 13.8
Sardinia 0.1 10.8
Molise 0.2 8.7
Campania 0.3 4.3
Basilicata 0.1 6.3
Apulia 0.1 6.2
Calabria 0.3 5.6
Sicily 0.2 5.2
Source: Elaboration from Vampa (2018)
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the personalization of politics, offering party leaders new arenas in which they
can nurture direct connections with sympathizers, bypassing the party’s
organization (Lachapelle and Maarek 2015). ‘Going social’, therefore, rep-
resented a strategic choice for the LN leader, allowing him to take control
of the party’s message, and to reach areas beyond the North that would other-
wise have remained off-limits. Salvini’s decision to heavily rely on SM – and his
ability to do so effectively – also helps to explain why he could bring about
such a profound ideological shift so quickly, without relying on any interme-
diaries. Salvini’s deployment of Facebook will be discussed in more detail in
the next section, which assesses the extent to which the Lega’s message
has changed under the new leader.
Methods
This section discusses the results of a content analysis, assessing what themes
Salvini and his party have chosen to emphasize in their communication, via a
study of a large sample of Salvini’s, and his party’s, Facebook (FB) posts. Given
the party’s complete reliance on its leader’s ability to communicate, the study
of these sources provides us with the opportunity to understand changes in
the party’s ideology and message since Salvini took over as leader (Bobba
2018; Enli and Skogerbø 2013). To reflect upon the significance of our
findings, in the following section of this article we also draw suggestions
from an analysis of elite interviews with the leaders of four LN regional
branches.
Considering the wide popularity of Facebook in Italy, we carried out an
extensive content analysis of both the party’s and the leader’s FB pages.3
We downloaded all FB messages posted between 14 December 2013 (when
it emerged that Salvini had won the primary election), and 15 May 2017
(the end of Salvini’s first mandate) – with a total of 63 162 posts from the
LN’s account and 11 603 from Salvini’s. We are therefore able to cover Salvini’s
first mandate as LN’s leader in full.4 A sample of 30 days was randomly
selected for each year (between 1 and 4 days per month), allowing us to
analyse 4768 messages posted by the LN and 1052 by Salvini. Next, we con-
ducted a human content analysis of these posts, with the unit of analysis
being the post itself. Our codebook focused on themes that we consider
key to the party’s strategic communication under Bossi: (i) issues related to
security, terrorism and immigration; (ii) references to Europe, the EU and
the Euro; (iii) issues concerning the economic crisis; (iv) references to the ter-
ritorial dimension, with a focus on distinctions between Italy’s North, Centre
and South. Furthermore, we added the category ‘northern interests, needs
and values’ so as to assess the changes occurred within the LN’s narrative
(full details of the codebook and the content analysis are provided in the
Annex). While mentions of the alleged ‘need to achieve autonomy/federalism’
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were counted as instances of this category, so too were references to
values such as the willingness to work hard, efficiency, readiness to abide
by the rules, etc. – that is, principles that Bossi’s Lega has always argued to
be distinctive of the peoples of the North (Diamanti 1996). This allowed
us to account for the focus (or lack thereof) on the needs and identity of
northern Italians in Salvini’s and the LN’s communication. To mirror this, we
also added another analytical dimension related to ‘national interests,
needs and values’, thus identifying instances of messages concerned with
the alleged specificity of Italian culture (vis-à-vis others). In this way, we
were able to quantify references to the need to ‘defend’ or ‘value’ Italy and
its identity, and any mentions of policies that were said to be necessary to
help Italy as a whole. All variables were dichotomous, meaning that we regis-
tered the presence of references (=1), or their absence (=0) to each of the
abovementioned categories.
Finally, we relied on a series of semi-structured interviews with party repre-
sentatives who, at the time of interview, were leading four of the LN’s regional
branches in order to find confirmation of our reading of the findings (or not, as
the case might have been) and check how high profile respondents justified
the radical changes affecting the Lega. The following regional leaders were
interviewed between June and October 2016: Paolo Grimoldi (Lombardy), Ric-
cardo Molinari (Piedmont), Edoardo Rixi (Liguria) and Gianluca Vinci (Emilia).5
The interviews focused on the following themes which are relevant to this
article: (a) the LN’s position on achieving greater autonomy/federalism for
northern Italy; (b) the reaction of grassroots members to Salvini’s redefinition
of the party’s ideology; (c) the party’s (and the leader’s) deployment of social
media. The leaders of regional branches provide the link between the national
leadership of the party and its grassroots (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015,
132–141). Not only are these respondents able to explain the official party
line and assess the communicative strategy adopted by their leader, but
they are also aware of the members’ reactions to the changes the LN has
embarked upon. While we do not claim our sample to be representative of
the entire regional leadership of the party, relying on interviews with high
profile informants has helped us interpret our results and reflect upon the
reasons underpinning Salvini’s strategy.
Findings
Analysis of Facebook posts
Figures 1–3 present the findings of the human content analysis of the party’s
communication conveyed by Facebook and that of its leader.6
The data reveal the following features of Salvini’s, and his party’s,
communication:
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. The three intertwined themes of immigration, security and terrorism –
which the electorate recognizes as being fully ‘owned’ by the LN (Bobba
and Seddone 2015) – are prominent in both accounts, especially after
2016. This shows the continued salience of these themes for the LN, par-
ticularly in light of the intensification of terrorist attacks throughout
Europe. Such trend is even more marked in Salvini’s case.
. Despite its importance to the revamped LN’s ideology as the focus on the
elites ‘of Rome’ is replaced by criticism of those allegedly based ‘in Brussels’,
the actual space dedicated to the EU by both accounts remains rather
modest, and is certainly quite secondary when compared to immigration
and security issues.
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EU Economic Crisis Immigration Terrorism Security
Figure 1. Lega Nord’s posts on Facebook: thematic categorization (January 2014–May
2017).
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Figure 2. Matteo Salvini’s posts on Facebook: thematic categorization (January 2014–
May 2017).
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. Overall, the amount of attention dedicated by the LN and Salvini to both
northern and national ‘values, needs and interests’ is limited. However,
the focus on national interests is clearly more pronounced than that on
northern ones, and the gap between the two tends to increase as the
years go by. In particular, it seems that both the LN and its leader do not
overly engage in discourses focused on regionalist claims. With few excep-
tions, indeed, the northern question remains pretty marginal. There are,
however, some differences in the narrative emerging from the two FB
accounts. On the one hand, Salvini appears more attentive to propose
messages that make reference to national values, needs and interests, by
adopting a nativist strategy. On the other, the party communication on
SM seems to privilege, instead, themes that are more in line with ‘tra-
ditional’ LN claims, such as security or immigration – leaving more in the
background references to national/Italian interests.
Taken together, these points suggest that traditional issues such as the
emphasis on northern interests, needs and values have lost salience over
time and tend to remain in the background especially within Salvini’s com-
munication. At the same time, though, claims concerning security are
central to the LN’s and its leader’s narrative. Most importantly, they are
framed within a national dimension, rather than a local/northern one.
Figure 4 helps to back up the last claim. It provides data about the geo-
graphical focus of the communication under discussion, showing whether
the party or its leader – in those cases in which this is made explicit – make
references to specific locations in northern Italy, or in the centre/south of
the country. As Figure 4 indicates, both Salvini and the LN have dedicated
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Figure 3. Lega Nord’s and Matteo Salvini’s posts on Facebook: National and Northern
Values, Needs and Interests (January 2014–May 2017).
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increasing attention to central/southern Italy in the last years to the extent
that Salvini now talks more frequently about these areas rather than the
North. This confirms our initial claim about the presence of a crucial shift in
the territorial focus (and relative cleavage) that defined the Lega under
Bossi, highlighting the extent to which Salvini deliberately wants his
message to resonate well beyond the borders of ‘the North’. The same
trend can be noticed in the LN’s case, but it is less marked – suggesting
that, whilst the focus on the national scale is ‘pushed’ into the narrative of
the party as a result of the growing salience of issues concerning security,
the ‘North’ has not been abandoned altogether. Thus, while the leader
‘detaches himself’ from the North in a gradual yet steady manner (especially
from 2016 onwards), the party ‘follows him’ – but only to a certain (and lesser)
extent.
Who’s standing up for ‘the north’? The views of regional leaders.
Following on from the analysis of Salvini’s and the party’s discourse on
Facebook, this section draws on interviews with high profile informants, i.e.
some of the LN representatives that were leading its regional branches at the
time of interview, and discusses the implications of Salvini’s change of strategy.
First of all, it is useful to stress that none of our respondents denies that
federalism/autonomy is no longer the focus of the party’s communication.7
According to our interviewees, however, this should be seen as a matter of
short-term tactic, meant to help Salvini rebuild support for the LN, and not
as a sign that the party has stopped caring for the autonomy of the North
altogether. Vinci’s explanation is very clear, and to a large extent emblematic
of the views of all interviewees on the topic:
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Figure 4. Geographical focus of the Lega Nord’s and Matteo Salvini’s posts on Facebook
(January 2014–May 2017)
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given that federalism is anyway the foundation of our movement […] we do not
think that it is the key theme, in this historical moment, to attract the consensus
that will allow us to govern. Concentrating our efforts exclusively on federalism
would not pay off just as much as the campaign launched by Salvini on immi-
gration and law and order is paying off right now, and these [i.e. immigration/
security] are themes that, for obvious reasons, need to be addressed at the
national level […]. These are themes that affect the entire country.
Rixi and Grimoldi further reinforce this view, arguing that federalism
‘remains in the Lega’s DNA’, with the latter adding ‘Europe’ to the list of ‘cul-
prits’ the party has chosen to focus on, claiming that ‘we prefer to stress the
problems caused by the Euro, Europe, immigration’. Playing down the signifi-
cance of this ‘strategy of silence’ on regionalist issues, Molinari says that the
LN is merely ‘adapting its message to a changed world’. Like Grimoldi, he
voices concerns about the loss of sovereignty experienced by Italy due to
its membership of the EU. He also underlines how the country’s interests
have been damaged by the imposition of sanctions on Russia – an important
market for Italian producers – and the lifting of tariffs on certain Indian agri-
cultural imports. By focusing on these themes, he argues, the LN can
provide an alternative people can embrace.8
Claiming that federalism ’does not sell’ in the current context is an extra-
ordinary admission for a party that has spent decades arguing in favour of
further autonomy for the North, and confirms the change of strategy we
have detected in our analysis. Indeed, Bossi saw the achievement of federal-
ism as essential and as the only way for the country to regain ‘its international
prestige in a European context’ (Bossi 1996, 133). Interestingly, though, whilst
Salvini presents, and in many respects embodies, a strategy of ‘nationalisation’
of the Lega, party elites – structured and rooted in the North – still recognize
the regionalist dimension and identify with it. Thus, they may conceivably
support the leader’s approach primarily for instrumental reasons, i.e.
because Salvini’s strategy is expected to pay off (as it did in March 2018) in
electoral terms.
The findings discussed above help to shed light on another significant
point. As previously explained, under Bossi the LN’s agenda was defined by
the cleavage between Rome and the North. Now, the ‘instrumental’ support
of regional leaders for Salvini’s newfound national mission means that they
seem prepared to concede that ‘the enemy’ against which the Lega has to
fight its political battle is to be found outside the country, in supra-national
and somehow more abstract dimensions – i.e. ‘Europe’ and ‘immigration’.
As such, the territorial cleavage has not disappeared from the LN narrative,
but it has been pushed further afield so as to adapt/respond to changed
‘global conditions’ that appeal to a larger section of the electorate. This, in
turn, helps to clarify how and why regionalism has been replaced by a form
of nationalism imbued with nativism. This is strongly promoted by Salvini,
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and embraced by all the regional representatives we interviewed, due to the
alleged need to address and stop what Molinari calls the ‘planned, meaning-
less invasion [by foreigners] that is creating huge social and safety problems in
our cities’. Rixi and Vinci echo this claim, emphasizing that the problem of
immigration is strongly felt by people. It is inevitable that the LN’s communi-
cation has to focus on these issues, Rixi says, not least because no other party
(let alone national and EU institutions) is paying sufficient attention to it.
Interestingly, Vinci also underlines that, had the party spent days discussing
this tactical choice at one of its conferences, the media (and also party
members) would have concluded that it was indeed changing its identity
for good ‘and becoming a national party […] a party of the nation’. As we
mentioned above, the interviewees present the shift towards the national
dimension as a temporary, strategic choice that does not change the
League’s original mission. And yet, the recent amendment to the LN
symbol before the 2018 election show that Salvini does not see these
changes as temporary after all, having de facto transformed the mission
and identity of the party by bypassing those who, at the local level, still
appear to be attached to the idea of a regionalist Lega.
A legitimate question – given the extent and speed of the change imposed
by Salvini to the party – is whether party members have accepted the idea
that the LN should show concern for – and talk to – Italy as a whole, or
may rather feel that its original values have been ‘betrayed’. While rejecting
the suggestion that these changes may have caused problems to activists,
our interviewees are open about the fact that they are impacting on the
kind of support the LN is able to attract. For example, according to Vinci
those who join the Lega today are ‘very sensitive to issues such as security
and immigration’. Moreover, Molinari admits that people approaching the
LN sometimes take it for an extreme right party, ideologically not dissimilar
to some neo-fascist groups. He argues that:
When people join and think they have joined Casa Pound [a neo-fascist organ-
isation], or a right wing party, we immediately tell them that the Lega is some-
thing else […]. I mean, the Lega is an autonomist party, we explain the party’s
history to them, certainly this is a party that focuses on identity, but not a
right-wing anti-immigration party, which is something else. So it is up to the
local branches, the local leaders to explain to the young people who join us
now what the Lega actually is.
This points to a clear division of roles between a leader who is free to set a
new agenda via means of communication (SM) he and his team control, and
the regional and local branches, which still strive to keep the regionalist flame
alive also among an emerging new generation of leghisti that is often alien to
the party’s ideological roots. Interestingly, in the view of a prominent regional
leader such as Molinari, these new ranks may have to be ‘educated’ to the
regionalist cause. This is perceived as one the main roles of the party on
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the ground, whilst Salvini’s role is to reach out and gain electoral consensus
more widely. On this, our interviewees are very clear: communicating with
the electorate and shaping the members’ views on political developments
simply cannot be done by relying exclusively on new technologies. Therefore,
while, according to Vinci, it is certainly very useful that ‘Salvini is on everyone’s
mobile phones and laptops’ as this helps to widen electoral support, the party
must remain a territorial organization. Similarly, Molinari says that he welcomes:
Having Salvini who acts as a megaphone, who is omnipresent on television,
social media, who is working really well and our task as local leaders […] is to
work on the ground, that is to contact people directly, by being present, by
talking, by seeking people out, seeking votes out, one by one.
He also adds:
I belong to the old school, rather than going on television […] or using Facebook,
I still prefer to speak in a square, or to shake hands in the local market […] The
work of the leader [i.e. Salvini] needs to be supported by work on the ground.
Rixi has a similar view, and explains that ‘you cannot replace a public
meeting with social media’. Thus, in the view of the regional party represen-
tatives that we interviewed, the mass party organizational model set up by
Bossi has to be maintained and defended, and plays a specific role which
cannot be fully substituted by Salvini’s personal style of leadership, mediated
via SM.
Overall, these findings confirm that the LN currently has two contrasting,
yet coexisting souls, building on similar ‘exclusionary’ values but showing alle-
giance to different ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991): the ‘nation’ as
far as the leader is concerned, ‘northern regions’ in the case of party elites.
This latent fracture between the leader and the party on the ground currently
remains on the backburner, mainly due to the excellent performance of the
LN in the 2018 general election – but could have profound implications for
the future of the party.
Discussion and conclusions
Our article has shown that the core theme defining the regionalist character of
the LN under its previous leader – i.e. the call for federal reform/northern
autonomy – has been put aside by Salvini, and replaced with an agenda
that has a broader national focus, and embraces nativist and protectionist
motifs.
According to Mudde (2007, 19), nativism is an ideology
which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the
native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas)
are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.
REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 659
This justifies the proposal of welfare chauvinist policies and is the basis for
the nativists’ claim that national cultures need ‘protecting’ (Ivaldi 2004). As the
opportunity presented itself for a party to ‘own’ the nativist agenda in Italy,
Salvini moved in and made sure his LN would occupy that political space. In
a context characterized by an entrenched economic crisis, heightened
levels of migration and mounting terrorist threats, nativist nationalism was
evidently seen as having the potential to ‘sell’ better than regionalism, thus
giving the LN’s leader a chance to boost the party’s electoral performance
and stamp his name on its ‘reinvention’. The data presented in this article
clearly show this, emphasizing both the salience of ‘external threats’ to
national identity and the shift in the territorial focus of Salvini’s discourse.
Thus, the LN’s leader has remoulded his party’s ideology through a nativist
lens which works well with, and in many respects complements, the other
original character of the party: populism. From a party that, in the 1990s,
wished to represent the dynamic and successful enterprises of northern
Italy, and thus appeared willing to recognize the advantages of immigration
to Italian industry (if perhaps grudgingly), the LN has now become one that
embraces the rejection of foreigners per se. In other words, both the party’s
inflexibility on issues having to do with identity and culture and its authoritar-
ian conception of society (based on compulsory heterosexuality and the tra-
ditional family, as well as law and order) have turned it away from the much-
proclaimed liberalism of the first half of the 1990s. Therefore, if the essence of
the populist radical right resides in a combination of nativism, authoritarian-
ism and populism (Mudde 2007), there does not seem to be any reasons
not to include the Lega into this party family today.
This development has important implications for both the party Salvini
leads and, more generally, regionalist parties. As for the LN, the process of
increased personalization (Karvonen 2010) that has characterized it in
recent years has been key in enabling Salvini to bring about the radical ideo-
logical change outlined above at great speed, and without any in-depth dis-
cussion with the party’s elites about the strategy being embarked upon. It is
then for the party on the ground, as some of our interviewees have pointed
out, to ‘educate’ newmembers about the LN’s traditional, regionalist, northern
values. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly Salvini who shapes the strategy of the
party today, sometimes even announcing radical changes before they are
officially agreed by the party’s ruling bodies – as it happened with the intro-
duction of the 2018 party electoral symbol, which was announced by Salvini
on television and brought before the LN Federal Council only the following
week. However, it is important to stress that regional representatives have
not gone away, and that their power bases remain the northern regions
(where, even today, the Lega still attracts the lion’s share of its vote, cfr.
Table 2). Our interviews suggest that regional representatives seem to recog-
nize that personalization is a vital electoral asset for the LN. Thus, they may
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support Salvini’s message and his style of delivery – but without ‘forgetting’
the party’s regionalist roots. Therefore, it would be a mistake to go as far as
conceiving Salvini’s Lega as a fully-fledged ‘personal’ party in which regional
power bases have become irrelevant (Kefford and McDonnell 2018). After all,
the party’s expected lifespan still very much depends ‘on the collective nature
of its organization’ (Calise 2015, 303) and is not seen to be, either by commen-
tators, party representatives or members ‘as dependent on the political life-
span of its founder leader’ (McDonnell 2013, 222). Personalization may well
play a crucial role in the contemporary context, but only as part of a
specific electoral strategy embodied by the leader. The fact that Salvini dom-
inates media communication fosters his role in framing the overall party
message, as it is typical of processes of personalization (Farrell and Webb
2002). However, the process does not go any further – at least for the
moment. Hence LN regional governors (and the leaders of the party regional
branches) still enjoy some degree of autonomy, mobilize in the name of fed-
eralism and take initiatives to increase the power of their own regions. The
recent referendums held on 22 October 2017 in Veneto and Lombardy on
whether these regions should be given more powers by the central state,
are a case in point. While the two LN governors at the time, Luca Zaia
(Veneto) and Roberto Maroni (Lombardy), actively campaigned in favour of
further regional autonomy and fully ‘owned’ the results, Salvini was noticeable
for his silence and jumped on the bandwagon only after the vote was taken
and won.9
Until now, this ‘internal fracture’ has not taken overtly antagonist connota-
tions, and has remained latent. Indeed, the results of the 2018 elections have
provided a powerful incentive to hush Salvini’s critics. However, such fracture
could increase in salience and create issues for the LN leader in the future –
especially considering the contradictions that underpin the ideological shift
of the party under his leadership. In particular, Salvini’s complete silence on
how Italy should deal with the huge and still unresolved regional divide
that has characterized the country since unification (Ginsborg 1990), and
still constitutes the key challenge to be faced by any governing coalition,
has been deafening. Hence Salvini’s nativist nationalism remains, in many
respects, an empty vessel, because it fails to address the thorny issue of
what constitutes ‘Italian identity’, and how the North and South of the
country can be (economically and socially) reconciled. Considering that,
since May 2018, the LN is in government with the M5S, it is likely that the
issue of how to allocate resources to develop the economy of the South
(and, crucially, where such resources are to be found) will have to be
addressed soon10. When this will happen, Salvini’s Lega will have to take
sides, and this could upset the fragile equilibrium between the party leader-
ship and its regional branches in the North that seems to have held during
Salvini’s first term as leader.
REGIONAL AND FEDERAL STUDIES 661
Our analysis also suggests a broader reflection on regionalist parties. To
some extent, the Lega has always been an interesting case, due to its
‘double ideological base’, i.e. regionalism and populism. The literature
shows that it is quite common for regionalist parties to experience shifts in
their agenda especially when competing at general elections, mainly
because claims aimed at challenging the vertical organization of power
within states are not very likely to win a large amount of votes (Elias and Tron-
coni 2011; Hepburn 2010). Regionalist parties also ‘use’ the European dimen-
sion in different ways to advance their territorial projects (Hepburn 2010). In
the contemporary context, and in line with our analysis, broader themes
such as immigration or the economy have gained greater salience, and
often become the issues around which the electorate polarizes. As a result,
voters tend to support those parties that are perceived to be most credible
on these themes. In practice, this means that regionalist parties have a
strong electoral incentive to focus on issues that ‘sell better’, rather than pur-
suing only a territorial agenda (Elias and Tronconi 2011).
Regionalist parties can thus strategically shift the focus of their agenda to
include broader issues (e.g. Europe, immigration) but, crucially, their overarch-
ing mission (i.e. represent a distinctive territory and its ‘people’) remains
untouched. This largely reflects the strategies adopted by the LN under
Bossi. Following a period of electoral decline and political isolation, exacer-
bated by the effect of Bossi’s fraud scandal on the LN’s image and credibility
(Vampa 2017), the party certainly needed a ‘wave of change’ to regain
support. And yet, in taking up this challenge, Salvini has taken the LN a
step further than any other regionalist party we are aware of, by changing
its very identity (i.e. shelving the party’s commitment to the ‘cause of the
North’ and embracing nativist nationalist stances instead). The other side of
the original LN’s ideology – i.e. its populist and thus intrinsically chameleonic
‘soul’ (Taggart 2000) – has been key in allowing this momentous transform-
ation. The ‘us versus them’ narrative that underpins both regionalist and
populist claims (and provided the glue between the two during the Bossi
era) has strategically been shifted. The ‘internal enemies’ (the Italian state,
the corrupted elite in Rome, and southern Italians) have been replaced by
‘external ones’ (the EU and the corrupted elites in Brussels), which are now
portrayed as the culprits of the country’s major ills – from sluggish economic
growth, to austerity and ‘uncontrolled’ migration. Within this frame, the
centre-periphery cleavage has not disappeared, but has moved up towards
a supranational dimension. As a result, the regionalist cause was dropped
and replaced by an ‘empty nationalist’ and nativist one – thus transforming
in a most profound way one of the key components of the LN’s ideology,
to the extent that, as we have seen, the party can be included in the populist
radical right party family.
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The idiosyncrasies implicit in the LN’s ideological shift under the leadership
of Salvini have been held off, at least for the moment, by the unprecedented
result achieved by the Lega in the 2018 general election. However, now that
the party is back in government, it will have to deal, one way or another, with
Italy’s most pressing socio-economic problem: the North–South divide. As this
article has argued, this is likely to put a strain on Salvini’s ‘reinvented’ Lega and
finally force it to address its contradictions.
Notes
1. Interestingly, ‘Lega Salvini Premier’ has also been registered by Salvini as the
name of a brand new party. In its statute, any explicit reference to ‘the North’
has been removed and replaced with the more general aim of ‘transforming
the Italian state into a modern federal state’ – thus including all Italian regions
(Gazzetta Ufficiale 2017). Some political commentators have speculated that
the creation of ‘Lega Salvini Premier’ may be a strategic move to partially
avoid the consequences of the scandal that led to Bossi’s departure, such as
the requirement that the Lega reimburses 40 million Euros to the state (Il
Fatto Quotidiano 2018).
2. For instance, the Five Star Movement’s candidate for PM at the 2018 elections,
Luigi Di Maio, is ‘liked’ by 1.6 million people on Facebook and has 340 000
Twitter followers, whilst M5S’ co-founder, Beppe Grillo, has 2 million likes on
Facebook and 2.5 million Twitter followers. Matteo Renzi, the former PM/
leader of the Democratic Party, has 1.1 million likes on Facebook and is followed
by 3.4 million people on Twitter.
3. According to InternetWorldStats, in June 2017 there were 51 836 798 million
internet users in Italy, namely 86.7% of the population. Of these, about 30
million were Facebook users. Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats9.htm (accessed 10 May 2018).
4. Since the collection of ex-post data on the number of followers per page is not
possible on FB, we provide a proxy in the form of the average number of likes
gained by each post, giving an idea of the exposure of each post. We have there-
fore counted an average of 19 638 likes per post on the FB’s page run by the LN,
which published an average of 49 posts per day throughout the period under
investigation. As for Salvini’s FB page, averaging nine posts per day, we
counted 89 850 likes per post (again, on average). This is significant, as it is
four and a half times higher than that of his party.
5. As our list of interviewees shows, we were able to speak with leaders of regional
branches representing some of the party’s traditional strongholds, such as Lom-
bardy and Piedmont (Diamanti 2003), but also leaders based in regions where
the LN has only grown in recent years, such as Emilia and Liguria (cfr. Table
2). The regional leader of Veneto (another key LN stronghold) was contacted
too, but he did not accept to be interviewed. All interviewees gave their explicit
consent to be identified in this and subsequent publications.
6. Data are presented per year. In the interest of comparability, we present the data
from 2014 onwards, since only less than a month of posts from 2013 was rel-
evant to this study (as Salvini was elected in December that year).
7. As mentioned earlier, the LN’s has used different terms (e.g. regionalism, feder-
alism, devolution, secession) to frame the issue of northern autonomy that
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underpinned their narrative of territorial distinctiveness. Since, in their inter-
views, party representatives use the term ‘federalism’ as a proxy for the
broader regionalist aims of the party, we also consistently deploy this term in
this section.
8. There is more than an echo here of the slogan of the Leave Campaign before the
‘Brexit referendum’ of 2016, i.e. ‘Take Back Control’, and also of Bossi’s motto in
the 1990s that northern Italians should become, once again, ‘padroni a casa
nostra’ (‘masters in our own homes’). However, Bossi saw the party’s opponents
as being the elites based in ‘Rome’.
9. The (consultative) referendum for further regional autonomy was won by very
large margins (98.1% in Veneto, on a turnout of 57.2%; and 95.3% in Lombardy,
although with a lower turnout: 38.3%). During the week leading up to the vote,
we found just one tweet on the topic by Salvini, and one short video on his Face-
book page.
10. It is worth noting that the M5S’s success at the 2018 election draws largely on
the wide support it gained in southern regions. Thus, it is apparent that the
LN’s coalition partner has a strong interest in bringing the ‘southern question’
to the table whilst in government.
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Annex
Data collection
The analysis focused on the Lega Nord’s and Matteo Salvini’s Facebook pages. We down-
loaded all FB messages posted between 14 December 2013 and 15 May 2017 using the
Netvizz application, therefore gaining a total of 63 162 posts from the LN’s account and 11
603 from Salvini’s. A sub-sample of 30 days was randomly selected for each year (namely,
between 1–4 days were covered for each month). The final data set included a total of
4768 messages posted by the LN and 1052 by Salvini. Next, a human content analysis
of these posts was carried out, with the unit of analysis being the post itself.
Codebook
All FB messages included in our sample were analysed through a human content analysis.
We identified a set of dimensions to provide an overview of the LN’s and Salvini’s political
discourse during the period covered in the analysis. In particular, we relied on different
variables by focusing on the following dimensions: Europe, Economic Crisis, Immigration,
Terrorism, Security, National Values, Needs and Interests, and Regional Values, Needs and
Interests. As these variables are dichotomous and not mutually exclusive, it is in fact
common for the same message to contain two or more of them at the same time.
Table 1a. Reports the details of randomly selected days for each year.
Details of the sample: list of randomly selected days covered per each year
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
15 December 03 January 03 January 03 January 03 January
27 December 18 January 18 January 18 January 18 January
19 January 19 January 19 January 19 January
21 February 21 February 21 February 21 February
21 March 21 March 21 March 21 March
03 April 03 April 03 April 03 April
11 April 11 April 11 April 11 April
21 April 21 April 21 April 21 April
03 May 03 May 03 May 03 May
23 May 23 May 23 May
12 June 12 June 12 June
14 June 14 June 14 June
19 June 19 June 19 June
06 July 06 July 06 July
10 July 10 July 10 July
12 July 12 July 12 July
28 July 28 July 28 July
04 August 04 August 04 August
06 August 06 August 06 August
26 August 26 August 26 August
10 September 10 September 10 September
18 September 18 September 18 September
27 September 27 September 27 September
03 October 03 October 03 October
19 October 19 October 19 October
21 November 21 November 21 November
23 November 23 November 23 November
28 November 28 November 28 November
09 December 09 December 09 December
12 December 12 December 12 December
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Table 2a. Codebook details (coding, coding instructions, examples).
EUROPE
[1= Reference to EU or EU related issues; 0= No reference to EU or EU related issues]
Coding instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to the European
Union, Euro, EU funds, EU commission or other EU institutions/political actors. It also includes those posts
focusing on domestic issues that make reference to the role of the EU. Moreover, it has to be underlined
that, taking into account external events that may have occurred during the period considered, in some
cases we registered posts making reference to other European political actors (i.e. references to Angela
Merkel declarations) as related to Europe.
Examples
. Lega Nord FB page (May 2016): SALVINI: NON VOGLIO CEDERE ULTERIORE SOVRANITÀ ALL’EUROPA
OGNI VOLTA ABBIAMO SOLO SUBITO FREGATURE. L’Europa faccia poche cose e le faccia bene. Dalla
Bolkestein all’immigrazione fino alle folli direttive sulla nostra pesca e sulla nostra AGRICOLTURA
abbiamo sempre subito INGIUSTIZIE. Basta cedere sovranità. [translation: SALVINI: I DO NOT WANT
TO CEDE FURTHER SOVEREIGNTY TO EUROPE, EVERYTIME WE JUST GOT RIP-OFFS. Europe should do
few things and should do them well. From Bolkestein to immigration, not to mention crazy directives
affecting our fishing industry and our AGRICULTURE, we only suffered INIQUITY. Enough of giving our
sovereignty away]
. Salvini’s FB page (July 2015): Formaggio senza latte vino senza uva cioccolato senza cacao. Se è questo
che ci impone l’Europa come denunciano la Coldiretti la Lega e tanti altri ANDIAMOCENE!!! [translation:
Cheese without milk, wine without grapes, chocolate without cocoa. If this is what Europe imposes on us,
as Coldiretti, the Lega and many others are saying, let’s leave!!!]
ECONOMIC CRISIS
[1= Reference to the economic crisis or bad economic situation for the country; 0= No references to economic
crisis or bad economic situation for the country]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to the economic
crisis. In particular, we coded posts focusing on issues such as: unemployment, unemployment rates,
shrinking of the welfare state, austerity policies, industrial production, taxes, the job market.
Examples
. Lega Nord’s Facebook page (January 2016): Troppe tasse: gli italiani riducono anche le spese per
addobbi e alberi di Natale. [translation: Too many taxes: Italians are even cutting down on Christmas
decorations and Christmas trees]
. Salvini’s Facebook page (January 2015): I negozi degli immigrati aprono i negozi degli italiani
chiudono. O gli italiani sono diventati incapaci o gli stranieri fanno i furbi. Chissà… [translation:
Immigrants’ shops open while Italians’ shops close. Either Italians have become incompetent or foreigners
are playing tricks. Who knows… ]
IMMIGRATION
[1= Reference to immigration or refugees crisis; 0= No reference to immigration or refugees crisis]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to content related
to legal/illegal immigration, refugees, asylum seekers.
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Examples
. Lega Nord’s Facebook page (November 2016): Clandestino stupratore già espulso torna in Italia e
chiede ancora asilo. [translation: Illegal immigrant, rapist, already expelled, comes back to Italy and
applies for asylum again]
. Salvini’s Facebook page (January 2017): INCREDIBILE a Reggio Emilia. Dopo aver protestato in Questura
per la qualità del cibo ai PRESUNTI PROFUGHI ospiti della Coop Dimora Abramo è stato assegnato uno
CHEF specializzato in piatti africani e pachistani. Cioè questi fanno casino e invece di espellerli gli
mandano il cuoco!?! Con tanti italiani che crepano di fame… Vergogna! [translation: UNBELIEVABLE
from Reggio Emilia. After protesting with the Police for the quality of the food they receive, the SUPPOSED
REFUGEES, who are guests of Abramo Dimora, were assigned a CHEF specialized in African and Pakistani
cuisine. What? They cause a mess and instead of expelling them a chef is sent over!?! With so many Italians
starving in the meantime… Shame on them!]
TERRORISM
[1= Reference to terrorism; 0= No reference to terrorism]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit reference to content related
to terrorism, bombing, suicidal attacks, ISIS, radical Islam.
Examples
. Lega Nord’s Facebook page (June 2016): L’ASSASSINO DI PARIGI GIÀ CONDANNATO PER TERRORISMO:
EURO2016 SARÀ UN CIMITERO Larossi Abballa combattente dello Stato islamico era stato condannato
nel 2013 come appartenente a una rete jihadista tra Francia e Pakistan. [translation: THE KILLER IN PARIS
HAD ALREADY BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF TERRORISM OFFENCES: EURO2016 WILL BECOME A CEMETERY
Larossi Abballa was a fighter for the Islamic State and had been sentenced in 2013 for joining a jihadist
network operating in France and Pakistan]
. Salvini’s Facebook page (January 2015): Solo oggi scopriamo che alcuni potenziali terroristi giravano
tranquilli per l’Italia frequentavano moschee si organizzavano. Ma come le moschee non sono mica
oasi di pace??? Prevenire controllare difendere i confini espellere. Prima che sia tardi. Buon lunedì…
[translation: Only today we find out that some potential terrorists were travelling through Italy
undisturbed, they were attending mosques, they were getting organized. Weren’t mosques supposed to be
oases of peace??? We must prevent, control, defend the borders and expel. Before it’s too late. Have a good
Monday… ].
SECURITY
[1= Reference to security issues (crimes); 0= No reference to security issues (crimes)]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to security issues
(i.e. murders, robberies, muggings, rapes, drug dealing, violence, etc.).
Examples
. Lega Nord’s FB page (November 2016): Lo scempio della Milano di Sala: gang latine padrone della città
[translation: The mess that Sala’s Milan is today: gangs of Latinos control the city].
. Salvini’s FB page (November 2016): A Milano 45 arresti per droga (quasi tutti immigrati). A Milano
pattuglie coi militari in zona Padova Corvetto e San Siro. Ma come il sindaco Renzi e Alfano dicevano
che va tutto bene! Servirebbe una bella PULIZIA GENERALE altro che balle. Non vedo l’ora di
cominciare. [translation: 45 people arrested in Milan for drug-related offences (almost all of them
immigrants). Military patrols in the Padova Corvetto and San Siro areas of Milan. What? Mayor Renzi and
Minister Alfano said that everything was fine! Some WIDESPREAD CLEANSING badly needed no more
bullshit. I cannot wait to start.]
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Intercoder reliability
The sample of FB messages was analysed via human content analysis. Data coding was
carried out by one-single coder. Intercoder reliability was checked via an ex-post test. A
sub-sample of FB messages was randomly extracted (10% of the overall dataset; n=
580) and these were coded again by a second coder. All the variables obtained
satisfy KA values (> 0.70).
NATIONAL VALUES, NEEDS AND INTERESTS
[1= Reference to national values, needs and interests; 0= No reference to national values, needs and interests]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to content related
to Italian culture, values, needs and interests. This category includes all messages which focus on
preserving Italian culture (i.e. Catholic values, language), as well as mentions of national sovereignty or
Italian economic interests.
Examples
. Lega Nord’s FB page (December 2014): #Salvini: Maggioranza degli italiani sono persone perbene. IL
PRIMO LADRO È LO STATO. [translation: #Salvini: the majority of Italians are good people. THE THIEF IN
CHIEF IS THE STATE].
. Salvini’s FB page (April 2016): Se devo essere processato perché difendo gli interessi degli italiani allora
processatemi domani mattina! [translation: If I have to stand trial because I’m defending the interests of
Italians then put me before a judge tomorrow morning!]
NORTHERN VALUES, NEEDS AND INTERESTS
[1= Reference to Northern values, needs and interests; 0= No reference to Northern values, needs
and interests]
Coding Instructions
This is a dichotomous variable identifying the presence of explicit or implicit references to content related
to Northern culture, values, needs and interests. This category includes all messages which focus on
preserving and defending Northern interests and what are said to be specific needs of the North, such as
autonomy or federalism. Similarly, all messages referring to what are posited by the speaker as northern
values, such as a willingness to work hard, efficiency, a readiness to abide by the rules, were coded under
this variable.
Examples
. Lega Nord’s FB page (March 2016): Simona Bordonali: Per garantire la sicurezza ai lombardi dobbiamo
trattenere le nostre tasse in Lombardia. [translation: Simona Bordonali: To guarantee the safety of
Lombards, we must keep our taxes in Lombardy]
. Salvini’s FB page (January 2014): Se non si paga il PIZZO allo Stato ladro un litro di benzina (a Livigno) si
paga 1 euro. L’Indipendenza conviene! [translation: If you don’t pay a BRIBE to the thieving state you’ll
pay 1 euro for a litre of petrol (in Livigno). Independence is worthwhile!]
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Table 3a. reports the Krippendorff Alfa for each variable reported in the article.
Intercoder reliability test
Name of the variable % Agreement Krippendorff’s Alpha (nominal)
Europe 98.3% 0.88
Economic Crisis 97.4% 0.828
Immigration 97.6% 0.932
Terrorism 96.9% 0.727
Security 97.8% 0.928
National values, needs, interests 97.9% 0.866
Northern values, needs, interests 97.8% 0.712
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